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ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS: HONG KONG'S PARADOX
OF POLITICS AND BUSINESS
.and now he was going ashore to witness the formal-
ity of taking possession, to watch a Chinese island become a
jewel in the crown of her Britanic Majesty, Queen Victoria.
Taipan by James Clavell
Hong Kong has been revitalized. The Sino-British Joint Declara-
tion, initialed September 26, 1984,' set in motion political forces which,
it is hoped, will maintain Hong Kong's economic system and way of life
through July 1, 2047. Until then, July 1, 1997 marks the date when the
British government will transfer one of its remaining colonies directly
to a communist state.2
Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China has adopted a po-
litical philosophy of "one country, two systems."' It is hoped that this
philosophy will allow Hong Kong to continue its capitalist economy
under socialist rule. In essence, Hong Kong's political future is viewed
as functioning as a regional government within a unitary system."
While under British rule, Hong Kong has successfully prospered as a
result of the impartial liberal economic philosophy of "positive
noninterventionism." As negotiations over Hong Kong's future ap-
peared plagued with ideological differences, the colony's economy no-
ticeably faltered. Since the signing of the Joint Declaration, however,
1. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Ques-
tion of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, United Kingdom-People's Republic of China, 1984 Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmd. 9352) [hereinafter Joint Declaration]; reprinted in 7 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & Comp. L.J. 141 (1984).
2. More Fears Than Cheers In Hong Kong, EuRoMoNFY, April 1985, at 151.
3. Id. Perhaps, Perhaps, Perhaps .... EcoNoMIsT May 11, 1985, at 3. A high
ranking Chinese official has stated that the expression "one country, two systems" con-
tains "no contradiction," and added that the concept "proceeds from the actual condi-
tions of Hongkong and Taiwan." It is a development of Marxism-Leninism and a "con-
crete manifestation of building socialist Chinese characteristics." R. Delfs & M. Lee,
Correct Ideology for Home Consumption, FAR EAST. ECON. REV., Dec. 5, 1985, at 14, col.
3.
4. Harding, The Future of Hong Kong, CHINA Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 36, col. 1.
5. Perhaps, Perhaps, Perhaps . . , supra note 3, at 4.
6. For example, between January and December of 1982, Hong Kong's stock ex-
change index, the Hang Seng, was halved. Hong Kong Future, ECONOMIST, Mar. 12, 1983,
at 52. Hong Kong's real estate market experienced a similar collapse as more than a
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Hong Kong's economy has experienced a slow and continuous upsurge.
Despite the currently improving economic climate, which has resulted
from China's recent liberalized economic policies in the world market,
the Chinese government is committed to its goal of building socialism.
7
This Note examines the historical background which has led to
Hong Kong's present political situation. It will highlight the provisions
of the Joint Declaration that many believe will greatly affect the eco-
nomic functioning of the Island. Opposing views concerning the advisa-
bility of investment in Hong Kong today will also be examined. The
political climate and its impact on the business community will be
given considerable attention.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Britain's possession of Hong Kong was the culmination of not one,
but three treaties signed with China in the nineteenth century. Be-
tween 1839 and 1842, China attempted to enforce its laws to halt the
profitable opium trade that supplied Great Britain with the capital
necessary to pay for China's goods.8 The attempt by China to enforce
its laws precipitated the Opium War.9 One result of this conflict was
the Convention of Chuanbi in 1841, through which an attempt was
made to cede Hong Kong Island to Britain.10 Both the British and Chi-
nese governments were dissatisfied with the agreement's terms and re-
fused to ratify it.1" Hostilities again resumed, but this time the war was
brought to an end with the signing in 1842 of the Treaty of Nanking, 2
dozen small property companies failed as a result of falling land prices and rents. Re-
Investing Optimism, ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 1983, at 93.
7. R. Delfs & M. Lee, supra note 3, at 15, col. 1.
8. BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES, HONG KONG, No. 80/84, Classification 7(b), at 6
(Oct. 1984) [hereinafter HONG KONG].
9. China grew increasingly concerned about its trade deficit with Great Britain which
was largely attributable to Britain's trafficking of opium onto the mainland. To rectify
this trade imbalance, China seized British trading factories and opium inventories in
Canton and other outposts. The Opium War (1839-1842) promptly arose from this at-
tempt by China to control the illicit opium trade, and essentially transformed China into
a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country with "consequent loss of independent control
over foreign trade." CHINA HANDBOOK SERIES, ECONOMY 388 (1984) [hereinafter ECON-
oMY]. For additional information on the causes of the war, see W. BEAGER, THE COMMER.R-
CiAL FUTURE OF HONG KONG, 11-16 (1978); Note, The Legal Implications of the Sino-
British Treaties Regarding Hong Kong, 4 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 111, 111-12 (1981)
[hereinafter Sino-British Treaties].
10. HONG KONG, supra note 8, at 6.
11. Id.
12. Treaty of Nanking, Aug. 29, 1842, China-Great Britain, 30 British and Foreign
State Papers 389, reprinted in 93 Parry's T.S. 465 (1979).
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resulting in China having ceded Hong Kong to Britain in perpetuity.18
In 1860, the Convention of Peking terminated further hostilities be-
tween Britain and China and secured to the British Crown the cession,
in perpetuity, of the southern part of the Kowloon Peninsula and
Stonecutter Island."' Hong Kong's boundaries were extended once
again in 1898 in order that Britain would be able to properly protect
its new avenues of trade. The Convention of 1898"s effectuated such
protection by authorizing a 99-year lease of the New Territories.1 The
1898 agreement itself "recognized that an extension of [the] Hong
Kong territory [was] necessary for the proper defense and protection of
the Colony."17
It was this lease of the New Territories, with a fixed expiration
date, that prompted the British Government to attempt to enter into
negotiations with China on the future of the Hong Kong territories.18
Following World War II, Hong Kong's economy flourished. By
1949, the Communists had come into power and established the Peo-
ple's Republic of China (China). Under the leadership of Mao Tse-
tung, the Communists focused on the problems of the Chinese peas-
antry," leaving Hong Kong's capitalist economy and industry alone to
mature.20 In rhetoric, however, Chinese authorities continuously con-
demned Britain's presence in Hong Kong, arguing that the three trea-
13. Hong Kong was ceded to Britain as an indemnity for all the opium seized by
China during the War. Day, The Recovery of Hong Kong by the People's Republic of
China-A Fifty Year Experiment in Capitalism and Freedom, 11 SYR. J. INT'L L. &
COM. 625, 630 (1984).
14. Convention of Peking, Oct. 24, 1860, China-Great Britain, 50 British and Foreign
State Papers 10, reprinted in 123 Parry's T.S. 71 (1979).
15. Convention with China Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, June 9,
1898, China-Great Britain, 90 British and Foreign State Papers 17, reprinted in 186
Parry's T.S. 310 (1970); P. WESLEY-SMITH, UNEQUAL TREATY, 1898-1997 (1983).
16. The New Territories comprise ninety-two percent of the total land area under the
control of the British Crown. HONG KONG, supra note 8, at 1.
17. 186 Parry's T.S. 310; see also P. WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 15, at 1, 11. "While
the stated original purpose of the acquisition of the New Territories was for defense,
they were, in fact assimilated into the commercial life of the colony" that already devel-
oped under the laissez-faire policies of the colonial administration. Day, supra note 13,
at 630.
18. HONG KONG, supra note 8, at 1. Thus, Hong Kong actually refers to Hong Kong
Island, Kowloon and the New Territories. Note, Legal Aspects of the Sino-British Draft
Agreement on the Future of Hong Kong, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 167, 169 (1985) [hereinafter
Legal Future of Hong Kong).
19. To make amends for China's past century of "degradation" and to create a "self-
sufficient egalitarian China," Mao understood that he had to look to the Chinese masses
and improve their lives. Sino-British Treaties, supra note 9, at 112-13. The slogan
"Serve the people" signified Mao's social aim to serve the collective good. Id. at 113.
20. Id. at 112.
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ties of the nineteenth century were void as unequal. 2' As a result, since
1949 China has often made claims that Hong Kong is actually a Chi-
nese territory. In 1972, the Chinese ambassador, Huang Han, stated
that "Hong Kong and Macao are part of Chinese territory occupied by
the British and Portuguese authorities. The settlement of the question
of Hong Kong and Macao is entirely within China's sovereign right and
does not at all fall under the category of colonial territories. '2
Hong Kong also saw its population grow immensely following
World War II. This boom in population was due to the return of many
Chinese who fled the Japanese invasion during the war,23 and the arri-
val of an additional 700,000 refugees 4 from the subsequent Chinese
civil war. 25 By 1956, Hong Kong's population grew to two and one half
million.2
During the Korean War, Hong Kong experienced economic stagna-
tion as a consequence of the United Nations embargo on Chinese goods
from the People's Republic.2 7 Following this lull in economic prosper-
ity, Hong Kong underwent an economic surge primarily founded upon
textiles28 manufactured for export, as well as the manufacture of
watches, clocks, toys, plastic goods and electronic products.2 s
As a result, Hong Kong's economy has continued, since the 1950's,
to be based upon export-promoting industries. This emphasis on ex-
portation seems to be a most natural occurrence in light of the fact
that Hong Kong maintains probably the most modernized and accessi-
ble harbor on China's coast.30 China's awareness of the value of Hong
Kong's harbor and access to international markets is reflected by the
fact that Hong Kong is China's number one source of foreign currency
earnings as well as its largest port of re-exportation.3' This dependence
21. Legal Future of Hong Kong, supra note 17, at 169. For a discussion of interna-
tional law concerning unequal treaties, see infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
22. J. COHEN & H. CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY
STUDY 384 (1974).
23. HONG KONG, supra note 8, at 7.
24. Day, supra note 13, at 631.
25. HONG KONG, supra note 8, at 7.
26. G. ENDACOTr, A HISTORY OF HONG KONG 310 (2d ed. 1973).
27. HONG KONG, supra note 8, at 7.
28. Many mainland Chinese who sought refuge in Hong Kong during the Korean War
were capitalists from Shanghai who established the textile industry that exists today.
Day, supra note 13, at 631 n.41.
29. HONG KONG, supra note 8, at 7.
30. W. BEAZER, THE COMMERCIAL FUTURE OF HONG KONG, 1 (1978).
31. ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 399. Re-exports are those goods assembled in Hong
Kong from components made elsewhere and subsequently exported once again. A. Igna-
tius, Hong Kong's Premier Capitalist Roaders Are Emerging as Peking's Trusted Allies,
Asian Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1986, at 16, col. 4. The importance of Hong Kong to China's
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on Hong Kong's capitalist structures will only help to assure the inter-
national community of the communist commitment to adhere to the
provisions of the Joint Declaration signed with Britain in December of
1984.32
II. PARTICULARS OF THE JOINT DECLARATION
The Joint Declaration signed between China and Great Britain
was an eagerly awaited event in the international business community.
It served to provide some indication to the community that their in-
vestments in Hong Kong would be preserved when the Island's sover-
eignty reverts back to China on July 1, 1997. The Joint Declaration
itself consists of a joint declaration, three annexes and two brief memo-
randa exchanged between the two countries. The annexes include an
elaboration by the Chinese Government of its basic policies regarding
Hong Kong; the establishment of a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group;
and a discussion on the question of land leases.3s The memoranda dis-
cuss the citizenship status of those persons who are domiciled on the
Island.34
An elaborate discussion of the provisions contained within the
Agreement is unnecessary because of the numerous articles that have
already been written concerning the details of the document.3 5 Neces-
sary insight, however, will be provided by emphasizing those elements
of the Joint Declaration that will, in all probability, have an impact on
the economic status of Hong Kong and foreign investment.
Of particular relevance is that the legal controversy concerning the
export trade is enormous. In 1984, Chinese goods sent to Hong Kong accounted for one-
third of the foreign currency earnings of China; and one half of the export commodities
originating from the mainland are re-exported to foreign countries through Hong Kong.
ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 399. Other sources have stated that since the 1960's approxi-
mately forty percent (not thirty percent) of China's foreign currency exchange has come
from Hong Kong. Day, supra note 13, at 632; see also Iyer, Making a Deal for 1997,
TIME . Aug. 13, 1984, at 25.
32. To clarify matters: The Joint Declaration was initialed by its negotiators on Sep-
tember 26, 1984; it was later signed by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and
Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang on Dec. 19, 1984. The agreement was then finally ratified
by both countries on May 27, 1985, and registered with the United Kingdom on June 1,
1985. Harding, supra note 4, at 32-33.
33. See Joint Declaration, supra note 1.
34. Id.
35. See generally Legal Future of Hong Kong, supra note 17, at 170-81; Note, The
Reversion of Hong Kong to China: Legal & Practical Questions, 21 WLLAMEmE L.J.
327, 333-37 (1985) [hereinafter Reversion of Hong Kong]; Mushkat, The Transition from
British to Chinese Rule in Hong Kong: A Discussion of Salient International Legal
Issues, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 171 (1986).
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validity of the Convention of 1898, which occasioned the lease of the
New Territories to Britain, is now moot.3 s Both countries have entered
into the Joint Declaration of 1984 on equal footing, and as such, it is
binding upon both signatories."' Sir Geoffrey Howe, British Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, as well as a key nego-
tiator of the final resolution, stated on the day the Joint Declaration
was initialed that "we have enshrined the results of our negotiations in
an international agreement binding in all its parts."' Howe later
added that, "this is a formal, legally binding agreement, the highest
form of commitment that can be entered into between two sovereign
states."39
36. China adheres to the accepted principle of international law that unequal treaties
are not legally binding because they do not fulfill the requirement of sovereign equality
between contracting parties. M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CON-
TEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 1177 (1981). Thus, China considers many of the nineteenth cen-
tury treaties it has entered into as "unenforceable, because of duress and the unequal
position of China in relation to the Western powers." Reversion of Hong Kong, supra
note 35, at 330. The traditional Western view that a country is bound by its treaties
despite duress or inequality of position has been modified by the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 52, 8 I.L.M. 679, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/37,
which voids any treaty procured by the threat or use of force. Id. Although China views
as void and unequal the treaties which ceded Hong Kong and the new Territories to
Great Britain, see supra notes 12-17, the Vienna Convention adds little substance to its
argument. This is because a) the Vienna Convention does not apply retroactively, Rever-
sion of Hong Kong, supra note 35, at 330; and b) the principle that as long as force is
considered a "licit activity," duress and coercion can not be invoked to invalidate a
treaty, McDoUGAL & REISMAN, supra at 1178. It follows that China's attack on the ine-
quality of the three nineteenth century treaties is futile since in Britain's view, and that
of the rest of the Western world, the treaties are considered "lawful at the time of con-
clusion." See id.
The Chinese thus perceived the Joint Declaration as a renegotiation with Great
Britain as an equal, of the three unequal treaties of the nineteenth century. Legal Future
of Hong Kong, supra note 17, at 186. This renegotiation follows China's political philoso-
phy that an affirmance of an unequal treaty or a replacement of it by a new agreement
between independent and equal sovereign states adds legality to a practical situation not
previously governed by rules of international law. P. WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 15, at
186-87. While not recognizing the validity of an unequal treaty, China's determination to
abrogate one is based on political not legal considerations. Id. at 186.
37. This commitment is clearly set forth by both countries in the last clause of the
Joint declaration itself: "This Joint declaration and its Annexes shall be equally bind-
ing." Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 8.
38. Address by Sir Geoffrey Howe, Press Conference in New York City (Sept. 26,
1984) (emphasis added) (available from British Information Services).
39. Id. One commentator has stated that the problems of Hong Kong in the earlier
part of the century were partly the result of the inequality of the contracting parties of
1898: "[A]n unequal treaty is not the most reliable and secure basis for the transfer of
territory and its subsequent administration." P. WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 15, at 188. If
this is a valid argument, and if the Joint Declaration is viewed by both parties as truly
[Vol. 8
HONG KONG: ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS
Despite the strong language used by Howe, Hong Kongers them-
selves have in the past voiced concern as to whether China will honor
the Agreement. 0 This concern led some members of Hong Kong's ex-
ecutive council to request the British Parliament to state that the
transfer of sovereignty will not be automatic but dependent on full im-
plementation of the guarantees in the Agreement."
The Joint Declaration at its outset officially declares the reversion
of the Hong Kong area from Britain's to China's sovereign control ef-
fective July 1, 1997. It then establishes Hong Kong as a Special Ad-
ministrative Region (SAR) in accordance with the provisions of Article
31 of the Chinese Constitution."" The SAR will be under the direct
control of China but will maintain a high degree of autonomy.4' The
Agreement also provides that China will promulgate and enact a Basic
Law of the SAR consistent with the Chinese Constitution." Of extreme
significance is China's concession that this Basic Law shall stipulate
that "the socialist system and socialist policies shall not be practiced in
.Hong Kong" and that "Hong Kong's previous capitalist system
and life-style shall remain unchanged for 50 years.' 4 5
An inherent conflict arises within the provisions establishing the
SAR and the accompanying Basic Law. Specifically, how can China
promulgate and enact a Basic Law which attempts to be consistent
with its Constitution and at the same time not endorse any socialist
practices, especially since China's constitution is itself a communist
document? This question must be resolved when China eventually
drafts the SAR's Basic Law." One fear is that China will intentionally
binding then the unequal treaties of the past pose no threat to Hong Kong's future sov-
ereignty. See also supra note 6.
40. Oh, All Right, Says Hong Kong, ECONOMIST Dec. 1, 1984 at 44.
41. Id.
42. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at para. 3(1). Article 31 stipulates that "the state
may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The system to be instituted
in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National Peo-
ple's Congress in light of the specific conditions." PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CONST.
art. 31 (1980).
43. Id. para. 3(2). Hong Kong's foreign affairs and defense, however, will be the re-
sponsibility of China.
44. Id. Annex I, Section I. This Basic Law, to be enacted by the National People's
Congress in Peking, will become Hong Kong's constitution, replacing the Letters Patent
and the Royal Instruction of the British colonial system. Oh, All Right, Says Hong Kong,
supra note 40, at 43.
45. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at Annex I, Section 1.
46. The first draft is not expected to be completed before 1990. Oh, All Right, Says
Hong Kong, supra note 40, at 43. One commentator has stated that "it will be hard to
find a formula of words that does not leave Hong Kong believing that it will be more
tightly controlled from Peking than it thought the settlement meant it to be." Perhaps,
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make the wording of the Basic Law ambiguous, which will offer an op-
portunity for China to undermine Hong Kong's legal system in the fu-
ture.47 It is unquestioned that the framework of the Basic Law is a
critical factor in attracting foreign investment in the future.48 Any ex-
isting Hong Kong law that will in any way conflict with the Basic Law
will be automatically deemed unconstitutional. 9
Of more immediate concern, especially in attracting a new flow of
foreign currency into Hong Kong, is the Agreement's provisions that
Hong Kong's social and economic conditions shall remain unchanged.
The SAR will decide its own economic and trade policies. 50 Specifi-
cally, the Joint Declaration provides that "[p]rivate property, owner-
ship of enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign invest-
ment will be protected by law." 51 The agreement also assures that the
Hong Kong SAR will retain its status as a free port and as an interna-
tional financial center.52 "There will be a free flow of capital.""3 Per-
sonal rights and freedoms will be preserved including "those of the
person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, [and] of
travel," among others listed.
5 4
Perhaps, Perhaps. . , supra note 3, at 9.
47. Perhaps, Perhaps, Perhaps . , supra note 3, at 9. See infra notes 80-103
and accompanying text for a discussion of problems confronted when interpreting the
Joint Declaration.
48. The Crucial Confidence Factor, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1985, at 162; see also Perhaps,
Perhaps, Perhaps . . , supra note 3, at 9.
49. Perhaps, Perhaps, Perhaps. . . , supra note 3, at 9.
50. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at paras. 3(9) and 3(10) (Hong Kong may partici-
pate in any international organizations and international trade agreements the SAR
chooses to enter, and may develop economic and cultural relations with relevant interna-
tional organizations).
51. Id. para. 3(5).
52. Id. para. 3(6) and 3(7). Hong Kong is currently the third largest financial center
in the world.
53. Id. para. 3(7).
54. Id. para. 3(5). Although China has not yet fully made its new presence in Hong
Kong felt, and despite assurances in the Joint Declaration, the free press has almost
reflexively begun to check itself. Most notably, it was reported by journalists and aca-
demics that during 1985, editorials were less critical of China. Leung, Hong Kong Press,
Fearful of Reprisals, is Taking a Softer Line Toward Peking, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly,
Jan. 13, 1986, at 20, col. 1. It is believed by those in the profession that this spreading
self-censorship, id. at 20, col. 4, is caused by fear that harsh criticism of China will be
retaliated by Peking by not consulting Hong Kong on its future. Id. at 20, col. 2. But
1986 has brought new hope to the true meaning of free expression in Hong Kong. The
South China Morning Post (the "Post"), Hong Kong's largest circulating English-lan-
guage paper, has recently had a shake-down of its management. Gupta, New Editor
Sparks Acrimony While Reshaping The Media Backbone of Colony Establishment,
Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Oct. 6, 1986, at 16, col. 1. With a controversial new Australian
editor, the Post's editorials now attack both British and Chinese policies which were only
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A Joint Liaison Group will also be set up by terms of the Agree-
ment. The functions of the Joint Liaison Group are threefold: it shall
"(a) conduct consultations on implementation of the Joint Declara-
tion; (b) . . .discuss matters relating to the smooth transfer of the
government in 1997; [and] (c) . . .exchange information and con-
duct consultations on such subjects as may be agreed by the two
sides. "5
Under Annex III, which addresses the issue of land leases, all
leases of land, granted before or after the Joint Declaration is in force,
that extend beyond June 30, 1997 "shall continue to be recognized and
protected.'"" The Agreement also permits the British Hong Kong Gov-
ernment to grant new leases until June 30, 1997 as long as they expire
no later than June 30, 2047.17
Leases of land, without a right to renewal, that expire after June
30, 1997 are to be dealt with in accordance with the land laws and
policies of the SAR.5 s In October of 1985, it was reported that more
than 30,000 New Territory leases which simultaneously expire in June
1997 might be renewed by one act of special legislation." An effective
and efficient mechanism for land lease renewals is a crucial element to
ensure Hong Kong's future prosperity. The Island cannot expect to at-
tract long term foreign investments without assuring the protection of
property interests. Thus, if the 30,000 New Territory leases are re-
newed by the SAR, it will help provide an impetus to attract foreign
recently viewed by newspapers as off-limits. Id. The new editor has reserved the right to
criticize any government and described the Post as "standing for more democratization"
in Hong Kong. Id. at 16, col. 3. Most recently, the Post strongly criticized China's arrest
on July 17, 1986 of the New York Times reporter John Burns (whom Peking accused of
spying), and the joint Chinese-Hong Kong venture to build a nuclear power plant only 20
miles from the Hong Kong border so soon after the Chernobyl disaster in the Ukraine.
Id. All this change in editorial conservatism comes at a time when the Post is considered
the most profitable newspaper in Hong Kong, if not the world. Id. at 16, col. 1.
55. Id. Annex II, para. 3. The Joint Liaison Group is not to pursue an active or even
supervisory role in the administration of the SAR. It will be essentially a monitoring
body. The Joint Liaison Group shall consist of a senior representative and four other
members, from each country.
56. Id. Annex III, para. 1.
57. Id. Annex III, para. 2. The total amount of new land that the British Hong Kong
Government may lease under Annex III is limited to 50 hectares a year.
58. Id.
59. Telex to the Commissioner for Hong Kong Commercial Affairs (Oct. 1985).
Hong Kong Standard reports . . . that more than 30,000 New Territories
leases which will expire in June 1997 may be renewed in one go by special legis-
lation. The paper says this is one of the options being seriously considered by
senior officials in the lands department who are looking for a cost-effective way
to deal with the extension.
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Of related importance to the securing of property interest, is the
unanswered question concerning a number of 999-year leases, many of
which are held by the Hong Kong Land Company. The explanatory
notes to the Joint Declaration give assurances that interest in the 999-
year leases will be protected." The clauses dealing with land leases,
however, state only that such leases will be protected under Hong
Kong law until 2047.61
Despite the noted ambiguities of the Joint Declaration itself, one
fact remains unquestioned: since the initialing of the Agreement in
September of 1984, Hong Kong has been experiencing an economic
revival.
III. A NEW EcONOMIC SURGE AMID POLITIcAL RUMBLINGS
The superiority of the socialist system in China has yet to
be brought into full play . . . due in great part to a rigid
economic structure that cannot meet the needs of the growing
forces of production. Top priority over the next five years will
be reforms in the industrial economics of urban centers to in-
clude rationalization of pricing system, local autonomy, a flexi-
ble planning system, great material incentives and bonuses for
the workers, the encouragement of competition, and an expan-
sion of foreign participation and investment in the Chinese
economy.62
This excerpt from the third plenary session of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China, released between the initialing and
signing of the Joint Declaration, firmly conveys China's intentions con-
cerning its future economic policy. From this economic forecast, it ap-
pears that Hong Kong will be one of its greatest beneficiaries.
Aside from this rhetoric, the central issue remains whether the fu-
ture economic success of Hong Kong as a world financial center will
continue, and whether "the rest of the world will accept China's assur-
ances that, after the British withdrawal, the banking, currency and
commercial institutions will remain undisturbed and completely under
Hong Kong management."
60. The Details At Last, ECONOMIST Sept. 29, 1984, at 35.
61. Id. See also Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at Annex III.
62. Holden, China Goes Capitalistic, 96 U.S. BANKM 47 (1985).
63. The Art of Staying Central, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1985, at 164.
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A. The Pessimists
When signing the Sino-British Joint Declaration, senior Chinese
Communist Party officials were concerned that foreign bankers might
not favor taking the risk of being supervised by the Chinese Commu-
nist Party. 4 This may have been precipitated by a realization by some
Chinese officials of the complexities inherent in drafting Hong Kong's
Basic Law in a manner free from socialist doctrines yet consistent with
the Chinese Constitution."
Since Mao launched his Cultural Revolution in 1966, there has
been a deep mistrust instilled in Hong Kong businessmen of China's
true intentions concerning the territory. This feeling of mistrust has
been a factor in every subsequent business consideration.6 Although
the force of this distrust may be questioned since it is not measurable,
it remains to be seen whether the individuals who have turned Hong
Kong into East Asia's most successful export manufacturing center and
financial market will be convinced that "they have a bright future
under Beijing's sovereignty.""7
China also undertook some "contingency planning" during the
Sino-British negotiation. China's studies of the Hong Kong situation
included "an assessment of how much Beijing would lose if a collapse
of confidence undermined the territory's economy.""8 The results were
not favorable for the Hong Kong entrepreneurs who wanted to believe
in China's good intentions. Although the report remains a secret docu-
ment, it is believed to have concluded that the Chinese economy could
make up the resulting reduction in foreign currency without much
hardship." Chinese officials indicated that the report went to such an
extreme that "China might actually benefit from cutting out Hong
Kong because it would have to share local profits of international trade
with local capitalists, high priced Hong Kong workers and foreign
investors."'
64. Id. Some bankers view supervision of currency and banking affairs as an essential
element of national sovereignty, which Beijing has stated it will recover and use over
Hong Kong, and may interfere in either Hong Kong's domestic or international economy.
Id.
65. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
66. The Crucial Confidence Factor, supra note 48.
67. Thomas Ivanyi, a Citibank vice president, expressed Chinese Hong Konger's mis-
trust in their precautionary behavior. "Take someone from Shanghai who rebuilt himself
in the 1950s and 1960s . . . .As soon as he had two dollars, he thought of keeping
one abroad, of keeping funds in Switzerland." Id. See also The Art of Staying Central,
supra note 63, at 164.
68. The Art of Staying Central, supra note 63, at 166.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Pessimists will also point out that much of Hong Kong's prosper-
ity is due largely to Britain's non-interventionist policies.7  With the
future largely in China's control, Hong Kong's government will be con-
siderably less non-interventionist."1 This shift away from non-interven-
tionist policy is expected especially when one takes into consideration
that the Chinese agencies presently on the island will expect to be
heard from in the future more than they have been in the past. Thus,
Hong Kong's established administration will have to take a strong
stand in order to preserve its authority."
Of particular interest is the question of how much capital China
has already invested in Hong Kong. Although the exact amount is not
known, 74 one economist has assessed China's direct investment in
Hong Kong property, manufacturing and services to be at least six bil-
lion dollars.75 This amount would account for at least one third of all
direct foreign investment in Hong Kong,76 thus, "[in a way China has
already reclaimed Hong Kong. '7
7
This reclamation is of even greater significance given the fact that
many lower level Chinese officials believe that China should not hesi-
71. Perhaps, Perhaps, Perhaps. . . , supra note 3, at 5.
72. Id. Reflective of this occurrence is a comment by a managing director of a Hong
Kong financial institution who stated that it is not unusual that after setting up a "big"
deal with Singapore or Malaysian money "[alt the last minute the Chinese authorities
cable to change the terms laid down in the documentation, and you say: we don't need
this, it doesn't happen anywhere else." Goodstadt, Hong Kong Builds Bridges to China,
EUROMONEY, Apr. 1985, at 158.
This frustration in conducting business transactions is largely the result of the prob-
lem that Chinese commercial law is not as well developed as in the western nations.
Business, Business, Business . . . , THE ECONOMIST, May 11, 1985, at 20. The root of
the problem has been summarized as follows:
China is establishing a code of commercial law, but it is a slow business that
proceeds through the publication of foreign-investment rules that are more in
the nature of guidelines than comprehensive legal enactments. Foreigners com-
plain that on issues such as compensation for breach of contract, the resolution
of disputes and the remittance of foreign exchange, China's law is too vague.
Getting it right matters not just for China and its foreign partners, but also for
Hong Kong's future. One of the advantages Hong Kong now has is its interna-
tionally accepted commercial law. More than just businessmen will be watching
how China learns to live with a western legal system.
Id. at 18.
73. Perhaps, Perhaps, Perhaps. . ,supra note 3, at 5.
74. The exact amount is unknown because the Hong Kong Government omits China
from its foreign investment statistics for the colony out of fear of frightening local busi-
nessmen. Business, Business, Business . . . , supra note 72, at 20.
75. Id. (the article does not state whether this is HK or US dollars).
76. Id. (the United States is the only other country that comes even close to match-
ing this amount of direct investment).
77. Id.
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tate to take "direct advantage" of the situation in light of the fact that
Britain has conceded that Hong Kong will become a Chinese territory
in 1997.78 Senior officials in the Chinese Communist Party realize that
such a strategy would jeopardize the increasing international confi-
dence in Hong Kong's long term survival.7 9 Although China has not
attempted to take "direct advantage" of its status as sovereign, it has,
nevertheless, begun to send a clear message to Britain and Hong Kong
that Beijing is closely watching the development of the colony's politi-
cal system.
What has most damaged the current state of affairs among China,
Hong Kong and Britain has been the attempts by the Hong Kong Gov-
ernment to pass a number of political reforms that would increase rep-
resentation of the Hong Kong people. On September 26, 1985, Hong
Kong held its first indirect elections for seats on the Legislative Coun-
cil (Legco), the Island's advisory law making body." These indirect
elections were conducted under an electoral college system.8 ' Soon af-
ter these elections, Hong Kong's Chief Secretary, Sir David Akers-
Jones, stated that the Hong Kong government is not required to con-
sult Beijing on how the territory is to be administered during the tran-
sitional period ending in 1997." At this time, political activists close to
Hong Kong's Governor, Sir Edward Youde, took the opportunity to
urge that direct elections on a one-man, one-vote basis should be intro-
duced for a certain percentage of the Legco seats in 1988.83 If permit-
ted, it is hoped that such a voting scheme will be incorporated by
drafters into the Basic Law. 4
Although China did not interfere with Legco's indirect elections,
China still fears that a more representative legislative body could
evolve into a powerful local government 5 which may become so inde-
pendent by 1997 that the people of Hong Kong will not want to return
to China.8 6 Implicit in this fear is Beijing's reiteration of its "objection
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. E. Lau, The Buck Stops Here, FAR E. ECON. REv., Oct. 17, 1985, at 28, col. 1.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. Some officials have talked of having twenty-five percent of Legco's seats filled
by direct election in 1988. J. Burns, Hong Kong Has Seen the Future and Has Doubts,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1986, at A2, col. 5.
84. Id.
85. J. Wong, Hong Kong Jolted as China Attacks Political Reforms, Asian Wall St.
J., Dec. 2, 1985, at 24, col. 3.
86. E. Lau, Laying Down The Law, FAR E. ECON. REv., Dec. 5, 1985, at 14, col. 1.
China does not want to face a situation where Hong Kong's democratization would reach
such a level that Britain "can disclaim responsibility and say they can no longer influ-
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to the concept of the Hong Kong government 'returning the adminis-
tration to the people.' "87 China's concern has arisen as a result of its
view that sovereignty and administration are inseparable.8 One senior
Chinese official has commented that such representation is a "retro-
grade step from the joint declaration."8 " Even some "unofficials" (non
civil servants) presently sitting on Legco have expressed their reserva-
tions about direct elections. To this group of "unofficials" a high de-
gree of autonomy "is not synonymous with independence, nor with the
freedom of action one normally associates with democratic government
based on universal suffrage." 0
China's tolerance, in taking a passive stance in permitting political
reforms to occur without its consultation, came to an abrupt end in
late November 1985. In a highly unusual press conference, China's
chief spokesman in Hong Kong, Xinhua news agency director, Xu
Jiatun, clearly enunciated Beijing's position that all political reforms
concerning the Hong Kong government should be halted until the Ba-
sic Law comes into force in 1990." In condemning the Hong Kong ad-
ministration's efforts to develop more direct representation within the
government, Mr. Xu declared that such policies were the result of Brit-
ain's "current tendencies to deviate from [the Joint Declaration]" and
suggested that such deviations would cause "unfortunate" conse-
quences for the colony.2 Governor Youde's only comment was that he
was unaware of any breaches in the Sino-British agreement.9
Thus, the issue of political representation has become the first
challenge to the Joint Declaration's ability to resolve political conflicts.
It is essentially the first time that the two signatories have differed
considerably on the interpretation of the agreement's meaning. Britain
has forcefully argued that a clause in the agreement directs that the
colonial administration will be responsible for local affairs until 1997.1
ence localised legislators." Id. at 13, col. 3.
87. E. Lau, supra note 80, at 28, col. 3.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. E. Lau, Consent to Concession, FAR E. ECON. REv., Dec. 12, 1985, at 21, col. 3.
91. E. Lau, supra note 86, at 12, col. 1.
92. J. Wong, supra note 85, at 1, col. 2.
93. Id.
94. Id. Britain no doubt is referring to the clause of the Joint Declaration which
states:
The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China declare that, during the transitional period between the
date of the entry into force of this Joint Declaration and 30 June 1997, the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the administration of
Hong Kong with the object of maintaining and preserving its economic prosper-
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Britain's position is that any reforms before 1997 are quite simply none
of China's concern. China, on the other hand, has stated that it is up to
the SAR, under Chinese leadership, to evolve the system of political
reform.9
Britain's actual position, however, is evidenced by the events
which followed the publication of China's displeasure regarding the
movement for direct elections.9 Hong Kong's Chief Secretary, Akers-
Jones, retracted his earlier statements, 97 declaring that the "Hong
Kong Government will inform Beijing of any proposals for political re-
forms in 1987 before they are made public here.""' The Chief Secretary
also mentioned that a "green paper," or consultative document, con-
cerning reforms would soon be given to the People's Republic." Trying
to save face, the Chief Secretary added that the "green paper" would
result only in an "exchange of views" between Hong Kong and Beijing,
but that Hong Kong would not be consulting China.10 0
The net effect of the "green paper exchange" is of great impor-
tance when examining the power struggle over grooming Hong Kong
for 1997. Essentially, it has confirmed the Hong Kong people's impres-
sion that although Britain had claimed it would resist China's interfer-
ence and not be "mere caretakers for the next 12 years,"101 it is appar-
ent that Britain lacks the "political will" to stand up to Chinese
pressure."" More importantly, Britain's submission to China's de-
mands has given Beijing a veto power over political reforms through
the transition period ending in 1997.103
Only one week after Xu Jiatun's controversial press conference a
second major political volley was underway. Pro-Beijing elements in
the Basic Law Consultation Committee's (BLCC) standing committee
were accused of introducing "a communist style electoral process" into
the election of seven BLCC "office bearers." 1 4 The BLCC constitution
ity and social stability; and that the Government of the People's Republic of
China will give its cooperation in this connection.
Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at para. 4.
95. E. Lau, Telling Big Brother, FAR E. ECON. REv., Jan. 16, 1985, at 37, col. 1.
96. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
98. E. Lau, supra note 95, at 37, col. 1. Akers-Jones agreed with a high ranking Chi-
nese official that "no major political changes should be made in the transition period."
Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. E. Lau, supra note 86, at 13, col. 2.
102. Id.
103. E. Lau, supra note 95, at 37, col. 1.
104. E. Lau, Haste Makes Waste, FAR E. EcON. REv., Dec. 19, 1985, at 14, col. 1
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sets forth the requirements to elect its office bearers. Accordingly, the
seven office bearers "shall be elected among members of the standing
committee."106 The standing committee, however, ignored the BLCC
constitution, thus violating the territory's rule of law, when four vice-
chairmen of the Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC)10 6 proposed
seven names to fill the seven posts.107 The proposal was seconded by
one of the nominees.10 8 There were no objections, and the seven were
immediately installed.109
As was to be expected, three BLDC members who had been in-
volved in drafting the BLCC constitution objected to how the elections
were conducted. They stated that "the selection of the office bearers
was un-constitutional because the four BLDC vice-chairmen had no
mandate to propose them."' 10 In calling for a new election, one Legco
"unofficial" stated that, if required, any member of the BLCC could
seek a court order declaring that the election was unconstitutional,
thus voiding the result.1 Xu Jiatun defended the election process say-
ing that the seven office bearers were selected "by election through
consultation," and that this form of consultation is but one form of
election." 2
[hereinafter E. Lau, Haste]. The BLCC's function is to collect public opinion in Hong
Kong on the Basic Law. Its 180-member body consists entirely of local people. The
standing committee is its executive arm. Id. Due to its large size and the diversity of its
members, the BLCC portrays an image of wide representation. However, it is already
rumored that the BLCC may be dominated by a powerful and united pro-Beijing faction
which in essence turns it into a rubber stamp. E. Lau, Peking Honours List, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Dec. 5, 1985, at 13, col. 2.
105. E. Lau, Haste, supra note 104, at 14, col. 2. The standing committee consists of
19 members elected from among the BLCC's general members. Id. at 14, col. 1.
106. The BLDC is a 59-member body appointed by Beijing to draft the Basic Law.
The Hong Kong interest is represented by 23 natives out of the 59 seats. E. Lau, Advise
Before Consent, FAR. E. ECON. REV., Jan. 2, 1985, at 10, col 2. Compare A. Ignatius, Hong
Kong's Premier Capitalist Roaders Are Emerging as Peking's Trusted Allies, Asian
Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1986, at 16, col. 2 (25 of the 59 seats are held by Hong Kong natives).
The BLDC's chairman is a communist party official. Id.
107. E. Lau, Haste, supra note 104, at 14, col. 2. One of the vice-chairmen of the
BLDC happened to be Xu Jiatun. Jiatun, in the previous week, had accused Britain of
deviating from the Joint Declaration. Id. at 14, col. 1; see also E. Lau, supra note 86, at
12, col. 1; J. Wong, Hong Kong Jolted As China Attacks Political Reforms, supra note
85, at 1, col. 5.
108. The nominee who seconded the proposal was Ti-liang Yang, a High Court judge.
E. Lau, Haste, supra note 104, at 14, col. 2.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 14, col. 3.
111. Id.
112. Id. Xu went so far as to say that the drafters of the BLCC constitution had
wanted to use the term "consultation" instead of "election," but chose not to because
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A "proper" BLCC standing committee meeting was promptly con-
vened in which it was agreed that the elections of the previous week
violated the BLCC constitution.' New elections were held with the
original seven names again being nominated and re-elected by a show
of hands.'
4
Understandably, the events discussed have seriously shaken the
public's confidence that Hong Kong's future will remain anywhere near
as free and autonomous as the Joint Declaration sets forth."5 With
regard to Mr. Xu's press conference, his comments are believed by
some to have damaged China's international reputation."" One retired
senior colonial administrator stated that Xu's message confirmed Hong
Kongers' suspicions that "the Sino-British agreement isn't worth the
paper it's written on unless Peking keeps its word."' 7 The chairman of
Meeting Point, a pro-Beijing political organization, expressed that the
BLCC affair damaged its reputation and independence, and weakened
the Hong Kong people's faith in the rule of law and democracy, thus
seriously undermining public confidence." 8
In order to quash the territory's worst fears, Beijing promptly sent
Ji Penfei, a Chinese state counsellor and director of Beijing's Hong
Kong and Macao Affairs Office to "repair the damage without giving
some in Hong Kong objected. Id. It is unfortunate for Xu that he did not stop to think
and realize that the three BLDC members who drafted the BLCC constitution were alive
and well but expressed no such intention concerning the choice of words. In fact, one of
the drafters of the BLCC constitution publicly condemned the selection of the seven
office bearers as unconstitutional. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
113. E. Lau, Haste, supra note 104, at 15, col. 2.
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
116. J. Wong, supra note 85, at 24, col. 2; see also supra notes 91-93 and accompany-
ing text.
117. Id. One BLDC vice-chairman expressed concern to Ji Pengfei, a Chinese state
councillor and director of Beijing's Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, that such state-
ments by Xu must be curbed, warning that "millions of dollars could be shipped out of
Hong Kong via a simple telex by anyone worried about Hong Kong's political stability at
any given time." E. Lau, supra note 106, at 10, col. 3.
118. E. Lau, supra note 86, at 15, col. 3. Another political group, the Hong Kong
Observers, wrote to Ji Pengfei that "[t]he action of the vice-chairman has caused a lot of
people in Hong Kong to suspect that Peking has already made up its mind on the details
of the future Hong Kong system. If that is the case, then the setting up of the drafting
committee and consultation committee would only be part of a charade, with little im-
pact on the ultimate contents of the basic law." E. Lau, supra note 106, at 11, cols. 1-2.
Public confidence was not boosted when at the same time of the unconstitutional selec-
tion of the seven BLCC office bearers, six BLDC were selected to the BLCC. This was
seen as an "undisguised attempt to dominate BLCC hearings. In so doing, the BLDC
could be accused of consulting with itself." E. Lau, supra note 86, at 15, col. 3.
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anything away."9 An indication of China's understanding of the im-
pact of Mr. Xu's statements and the void BLCC election is evidenced
by the fact that Ji is the highest ranking Chinese official to visit Hong
Kong since 1949.120
Along with Ji's visit it was made known that Beijing is considering
allowing 60 percent of Legco's seats to be directly elected.' 2 ' This
would be conditioned upon concentrating power in the chief executive
who would be advised by a 100-member executive advisory council
composed of mostly local capitalists. 22 Though Ji's visit seems to have
quieted the political climate, the damage has been done and it is not so
easily removed. The Island will continue conducting its affairs until the
next bite is taken out of its autonomy by Beijing.
Although the fears of the pessimists are persuasive and can not be
dismissed as mere fantasy, there are overwhelming indications that the
economic recovery Hong Kong is experiencing is not based on false
pretense or misguided speculation.
B. The Optimists
Businessmen have continued to maintain that there is a profitable
future for their private enterprise in Hong Kong.2 3 "Here money
speaks."' 2 " Only two months after the signing of the accord on Decem-
ber 19, 1984, the Hang Seng market index had increased by 15% to its
highest level in two-and-a-half years.'2 5 Exemplifying the market's vol-
atility was its immediate drop of almost 50 points the day after Xu's
accusation that Britain was deviating from the Joint Declaration.2
Characteristically, the Hang Seng index rebounded in a frenzy. Only
six weeks after the sudden drop, the Hang Seng closed at a new record
high in its history. 27
119. E. Lau, supra note 106, at 10, col. 2.
120. Id. at 10, col. 1.
121. Id. at 11, col. 1; compare supra note 83 and accompanying text.
122. Id. at 11, col. 1.
123. Finer, Hong Kong 1997: When the Kissing Has to Stop, 56 POL. Q. 262, 265
(1985).
124. Id.
125. Elliott & Jones, A Bullish Outlook for the Year of the Ox, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb.
4, 1985, at 43; compare Deng and the Dollar Rend Hong Kong Assunder, 292 ECONOMIST
71 (July 14, 1985) (the first two weeks in July, 1984 saw the Hong Kong index have its
sharpest decline).
126. E. Lau, supra note 86, at 15, col. 2; see also supra note 91 and accompanying
text.
127. Hang Seng Soars to Record, But Rumors Force Retreat, Asian Wall St. J., Jan.
13, 1986, at 27, col. 1. The record high was set at 1826.84 on Wednesday, Jan. 8, 1986.
The Hang Seng's previous market record of 1810.2 was set back on July 17, 1981. Id.
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In January 1985, two corporate transactions of major significance
occurred. First, Hutchinson Whampoa, Hong Kong's only Chinese
"hong,"1 8 acquired -control of Hong Kong Electric from the Hong
Kong Land Company. Second, a joint venture contract was signed be-
tween China Light & Power and Beijing to build China's first nuclear
power plant. Both transactions were the work of two of Hong Kong's
most powerful taipans, s9 and reflect their confidence in and optimism
for the Sino-British accord.130
Perhaps the most valid indicator of the present mood of invest-
ment in Hong Kong is in land sales and office space sales. Land invest-
ment has increased since the real estate market collapse in 1981-
1982.131
An improvement in the residential property market is a result of
the return of a vast number of people who had previously emigrated
from Hong Kong.13 2 Due to this, vacancies in private domestic prem-
ises are falling.' This comes as good news for developers and traders
and "important for Hong Kong's stock market which is ironically dom-
inated by property companies."'" 4
Even more indicative of the growing strength of Hong Kong's
economy is the decline in available office space. Although the market
128. A "hong" is a commercial establishment or house of foreign trade. WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1086-87 (1981).
129. "Taipan" is from the Chinese word for "big boss." Singer, The Taipans of Hong
Kong, CHINA Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 38.
130. The Era of the Bull, ASIAN FIN., Mar. 15, 1985, at 40. The acquisition by Hutch-
inson Whampoa of Hong Kong Electric involved the single largest check ever to change
hands in Hong Kong's corporate history. Li Ka-shing, chairman of Hutchison, may have
conducted the transaction in such a manner as a symbolic gesture "to tell the world that
everything is going to be all right with Hong Kong." Id. It might be added that as a
result of Li Ka-shing's recent acquisitions, he now controls four companies whose com-
bined capitalization accounts for nearly 10 percent of Hong Kong's entire stock market.
Elliot & Jones, Hong Kong's Li Ka-shing Puts His Money Where His Mouth Is, BUSI-
NESS WEEK, Feb. 4, 1985, at 44. It is no wonder that Li, with holdings so large in Hong
Kong, is committed to Hong Kong's future and wants to portray a climate of stability for
investment. One must keep in mind, however, that he further committed himself with
the acquisition of Hong Kong Electric after the signing of the Sino-British accord, re-
flecting a true capitalist spirit of confidence in Hong Kong's future. Li wields such influ-
ence in the Hong Kong business community that his latest moves were expected to set
off a stock-buying stampede. Elliot & Jones, supra note 125, at 43.
131. See Hong Kong: With Agreement Confidence Returns to Office Market. 27 INT'L
REAL EST. INVESTOR 54 (Jan. 1984); Era of the Bull, supra note 130, at 42-43.
132. Era of the Bull, supra note 130, at 42.
133. Apartment sales reached an all time height in 1985. According to the Registrar
General's Office, 54,405 apartments were sold in 1985, an increase of 81.6 percent. Hong
Kong Business Briefs, Asian Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1986, at 13, col. 2.
134. Era of the Bull, supra note 130, at 42.
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for commercial office space is still in oversupply, realtors are not overly
concerned because, as one international real estate firm stated, "[tihe
demand is increasing in Central [downtown] for prime office space, and
there's no new large office building coming up over the next two or
three years."'' 5 Some realtors are predicting that there might in fact be
a shortage of office space by 1988-1989 which would drive rents
higher.' 6
Construction is also experiencing a healthy rebound. Hong Kong
Land Company18 7 has already decided to add a third tower to its Ex-
change Square complex, predicting with confidence that there will be a
"firming up of demand" to absorb the newly created space.' 8 Hutchin-
son Whampoa has given the go-ahead on a 94-story residential and
commercial development on Kowloon's waterfront which will be the
biggest development ever undertaken in Hong Kong.8 9 Hutchinson's
director, Mr. Li, has full faith that the "property market is now at its
lowest and will pick up on its own momentum.' ' 4 0
On September 24, 1985, the first government land auction took
place under the Joint Declaration and was hailed as a success. " ' The
six lots involved were the first sold in the New Territories with leases
that extend beyond 1997, and for which the proceeds will be divided,
as pre-determined by the Joint Declaration between China and the
government of Hong Kong." 2 Sir Edward Youde, Governor of the Is-
land, said the land sales are evidence that "the Agreement on the fu-
ture of Hong Kong has stood the test . . . in the first year," and
added that "the Agreement is going into effect and steady progress will
be made to put into effect all the arrangements in it.''
135. Id. at 44.
136. Id. The Bank of China has begun construction on its Hong Kong branch build-
ing which is to become Hong Kong's tallest structure by far. This symbolic gesture in
"concrete and curtain walls" may reflect China's commitment to preservation of Hong
Kong's economy. Business, Business, Business . . . , supra note 72, at 20.
137. The Hong Kong Land Company is the largest single land holder in Hong Kong
today. Hong Kong Land Plans A Commercial Paper Issue Of $128.5 Million, Asian Wall
St. J., Oct. 21, 1985, at 30, col. 4.
138. Era of the Bull, supra note 130, at 44.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Hong Kong's Auction of Land Successful, Pacific Basin, Sept. 25, 1985, at A5,
col. 5; Letter from the Commissioner of Hong Kong Commercial Affairs to Members of
the Hong Kong Association (Nov. 1985) (available at the Hong Kong Commissioners Of-
fice, New York City).
142. Hong Kong's Auction, supra note 141, at 5A, col. 6. (A Hong Kong government
agent said that the "sales have not shown massive increases that could indicate a boom
[but] the steady rise and strength of the market.").
143. Telex from DIS to the Hong Kong Trade Commissioner, New York City (Sept.
[Vol. 8
HONG KONG: ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS
From the previous discussion it becomes apparent that real estate
investors, who were crippled and nearly destroyed during the collapse
of the property market in 1981-82, would be one of the last investors to
take expansive measures unless they had a firm conviction that Hong
Kong's growth will continue.
Banking is another critical facet of Hong Kong's economy. Due to
the large volume of business transactions that occur on the island,
banking is big business. The current increase in the regulation of bank-
ing practices should provide improved security to business transactions
and attract additional foreign investment. " It is widely believed that
the strength of Hong Kong's banks is considered an essential protec-
tion against intervention by Beijing in Hong Kong's internal affairs. '5
It will, however, take a major effort from the banking community to
provide this needed strength. The financial services available in Hong
Kong did not develop as a result of government encouragement but
rather because "financiers found it to be the right environment."'""
A recent market development exemplifies the financial commu-
nity's innovative efforts to keep a step ahead of Beijing. In 1985, a
Hong Kong Index futures contract will be introduced onto the financial
market.147 Designed primarily for local investors, it is hoped that a suc-
25, 1985).
144. In the past two and one half years the Hong Kong government has taken over
three local banks which had failed primarily because of bad loans. Hye, Hong Kong
Secretly Backs Ka Wah With Public Funds, Asian Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1986, at 4, col. 1.
It is thus apparent that regulations are needed to prevent such liquidity problems and
secure the confidence of the public in the Island's banking institutions.
On Jan. 8, 1986, the China International Trust and Investment Corporation, which
is directly responsible to China's State Council, announced an "agreement in principle"
to take over Ka Wah Bank. Id. at col. 2. Some have viewed the bail out of Ka Wah as a
showing of Beijing's willingness to keep its promises to help maintain Hong Kong's sta-
bility and prosperity. Id.
145. Rooks, China's Reunification Policy Shades Economics of Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Oregonian Sun, Sept. 1, 1985, at 3.
146. The Art of Staying Central, supra note 63, at 165. Fell, Hong Kong's banking
commissioner, stated that financial authorities must give positive encouragement to new
activities and institutions. "If Hong Kong is going to be more than just another manufac-
turing city in southern China we've got to get the financial centre right, and we've got
limited time." Id. at 166.
147. Geraghty, A Step Into The Financial Futures, ASIAN FIN., Mar. 15, 1985, at 74.
"Conceptually, the stock index represents a diversified portfolio, and the provision of
stock index futures may encourage equity holding by minimizing the risks posed by mar-
ket fluctuations . . . .By definition, a stock index futures contract is a commitment
to participate in the overall price movement of the stock market as measured by some
underlying stock index." The Mechanics of Stock Index Futures, ASIAN FIN., Mar. 15,
1985, at 76 (see this article for an example of a practical application of the futures
contract).
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cessful futures contract will open the door to other new futures con-
tracts based on gold, currencies and financial instruments, which would
add further depth to Hong Kong's financial center."1 8
Aside from Hong Kong's banking and financial institutions, it pos-
sesses one resource essential to any capitalist infra-structure-people.
In the long run, Hong Kong's greatest asset may be its people. The
labor force, which is intelligent and well-trained, is able to adapt to
continual changes in industry. " This ability has contributed greatly to
Hong Kong's economic success.1"' This is especially important consid-
ering the presence of a large number of light industries, where if one
product is not successful the company may change the production line
quickly to manufacture another product.15'
There is some concern that the Sino-British accord might have a
negative impact upon the middle class, a segment of the population
upon which Hong Kong so regularly depends.152 The Nationality Act,
which is derived from the Joint Declaration,'5 has instilled fears in
many Chinese Hong Kongers that they might one day have to move
again to avoid being subjected to a standard of living along socialist
lines.1" This is understandable since many emigrated to the Island to
escape such socialist restraints on their lives.
Economically, China and Hong Kong are becoming increasingly in-
terdependent. As a result, investors may lend greater credence to sig-
nals by the Central Committee of China's Communist Party that it will
not only be more tolerant, but will actively seek liberal reforms in its
economic structures.1 55
148. Geraghty, supra note 147, at 74.
149. See The Art of Staying Central, supra note 63, at 166. One prominent financial
investor has stated: "We're entering unknown territory, there isn't a precedent [but] I
can't think of better people to venture into the unknown - entrepreneurial Hong Kong
Chinese." Id.,; see also Reverse Takeover, AsIAN FIN., Mar. 15, 1985, at 47 (population
able to constantly change from one industry to another). Cultural attributes such as a
strongly ingrained work ethic and pursuit of excellence, as well as limited political aspi-
rations under colonial rule, have helped make Hong Kong entrepreneurs extremely ag-
gressive and dynamic. E. Chen, Maintaining Hong Kong's Prosperity, CHINA Bus. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 7, col. 2. In addition, the absence of strong trade unions and mini-
mum wage laws, and high labor mobility contribute to the Island's ability to maintain
competitive wage rates in the world market. Id.
150. Reverse Takeover, supra note 149, at 47.
151. Id. at 46.
152. Id. at 47.
153. On Sept. 10, 1982, China decreed a Nationality Act which expressly rejects "dual
nationality." S. Finer, Hong Kong 1997: When The Kissing Has To Stop, POL. Q. 262,
269 (1985).
154. Reverse Takeover, supra note 149, at 47.
155. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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Growth in Hong Kong's domestic exports and re-exports to China
are striking. Hong Kong's domestic exports to China grew from HK$81
million in 1978 to HK$11.3 billion in 1984, while re-exports grew from
HK$214 million in 1978 to HK$28 billion in 1984.156 This accounts for
approximately one-half of all Hong Kong's re-exports. 157 Re-exports
have resulted in a booming market since they are sold for more than
the cost of importing them.158 Similarly, China has increased its sup-
plies to Hong Kong. In 1984, China's exports to Hong Kong reached
over HK$55.8 billion from only HK$10.6 billion in 1978.159 Also signifi-
cant is China's move to becoming Hong Kong's second largest trading
partner after being ranked only twenty-fifth in 1978.160 Some observers
warn that China's new open door policies might result in Hong Kong
markets becoming overdependent on the mainland. 161 In the first five
months of 1985, Hong Kong's trade with China jumped forty-four per-
cent compared to the same period in 1984.11s This accounted for more
than a quarter of Hong Kong's total trade during this period. 63
Notice should also be taken of the recent movement towards pro-
tectionism by the industrialized countries of the world. Analysts have
urged that now is the time Hong Kong should make the transition
from labor-intensive to technological and capital-intensive export in-
dustries."" For example, when the United States Senate approved the
Jenkins Bill on October 11, 1985, textile manufacturers in Hong Kong
feared they would have much to lose. 1 5 The bill was to set limits on
textile imports to the United States,1" which incidentally happens to
be Hong Kong's largest trading partner. 1 7 Thus, when President Rea-
gan vetoed the Jenkins Bill on Dec. 10, 1985, government officials and
industry leaders in Hong Kong were greatly relieved.6 " As Hong
156. C. Beckett, Hong Kong's China Market, CHINA Bus. Rav., Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 41,
col. 3.
157. Protectionist Threats, Commodities Slump Clouds on Regions Trade Prospects,
Asian Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1985, at col. 4 [hereinafter Protectionist Threats].
158. Id. (re-exports to all destinations in the first eight months of 1985 rose 37% to
$9.02 billion; those to China rose 140% in the first half).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. See also supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. E. Chen, Maintaining Hong Kong's Prosperity, CHINA Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct.
1985, at 37, col. 3.
165. Protectionist Threats, supra note 157, at 1, col. 3.
166. Id.
167. C. Beckett, supra note 156, at 41, col. 3.
168. Hong Kong Government Information Services, WEEK IN HONG KONG, No. 50/85
(Dec. 16-22, 1985).
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Kong's overall domestic export market is declining'6" such threatening
protectionist measures are increasingly causing more concern than sim-
ilar international moves did in 1982.170 In the long run, it would appear
that Hong Kong's comparative advantage in traditional exports is be-
coming exhausted and it is essential that its "comparative advantage in
technology and capital (both human and physical) intensive indus-
tries" be realized.171
Moreover, in geo-political terms, China needs to assure Hong
Kong's future economic stability in order for China to attain the
"crown jewel"' 7 5-Taiwan. s7 3 Conceivably, Beijing's "ultimate goal of
reunification with Taiwan" will be heavily weighed when analyzing its
commitments to Hong Kong. 7 To do otherwise would not only endan-
ger Hong Kong's prosperity, but would reconfirm Taiwan's already set-
tled perception of the faults of Communist rule.17 5 Thus, the doctrine
of "one country, two systems" was devised by Deng Xiaoping to justify
tolerance of Hong Kong's capitalist system coexisting with China's so-
cialist system, and can also be viewed as an offer directed to Taiwan.1
6
As China's leader,17 7 Deng Xiaoping is the central figure in nurtur-
ing the international business community's confidence in the stability
of Hong Kong's markets and land values. Deng has also been the fore-
169. In the first eight months of 1985, domestic exports dropped 6.2% from a year
earlier to $10.77 billion. Protectionist Threats, supra note 157, at 22, col. 4. Domestic
exports for the year ending 1985 fell 5.8 percent, the greatest yearly decline in domestic
shipments since such statistics have been available (1964). A. Ignatius, supra note 31, at
16, col. 2. The decline in domestic exports was largely attributed to a decline in United
States demand and curbs on China's imports. Id.
170. Protectionist Threats, supra note 157, at 22, col. 4.
171. E. Chen, supra note 149, at 40, col. 3. Hong Kong's "comparative advantage"
refers to its versatile work force and competitive wages (see supra notes 149-51 and ac-
companying text) and the readily available sources of funds and technology. E. Chen,
supra note 149, at 37.
172. Hsiung, The Hong Kong Settlement: Effects on Taiwan And Prospects For Pe-
king's Reunification Bid, 12 AsIAN AFFAIRs 47, 49 (1985).
173. The Taiwanese government calls itself the Republic of China and considers it-
self the true Chinese government that controlled the mainland until the Communist in-
surrection drove it to Taiwan in 1949. Id. at 51. As a matter of interest, Taiwan currently
possesses the original copies of the three nineteenth century Sino-British treaties. See
supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
174. Hsiung, supra note 172, at 57.
175. Id. In anticipation of Hong Kong's return to China's sovereignty, Taiwan is to
remove its presence from Hong Kong by 1997 in order to make reunification more diffi-
cult and unlikely. Id. at 53.
176. Id. at 50.
177. Deng is currently chairman of the party and state military commissions, and the
party's central advisory commission. V. Fung, Deng Paves Way for a Smooth Succession
In China, Hoping to Keep Policies Alive, Asian Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1986, at 6, col. 2.
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runner in China's political movement towards a more capitalistically
oriented socialism. 7 8 Lord Kadoori, one of Hong Kong's leading
taipans, has stated that Deng told him in confidence that "though
China would remain a socialist government, it realised fully the need
for modernizing, and that. . .they would use capitalism to improve
socialism.'
'1 79
Deng, having reached the young age of 81, realizes that upon step-
ping down he must leave behind a communist party that will continue
his regime's acceptance of western economic concepts. Thus, Deng has
given high priority to the succession issue.'80 In this vein, Deng re-
cently ousted nearly one-third of the present military and political es-
tablishment and replaced them with sixty-four younger and better ed-
ucated people who are perceived to be more technically competent.18 '
Realizing that the issue of succession is crucial to the future of his
open-door policies and economic liberalization, Deng has already ar-
ranged for an orderly transfer of power to Hu Yaobang, the party Sec-
retary-General, and Zhao Zeying, the Prime Minister. 8 2 If Deng steps
down from power in 1987 as has been rumored, Mr. Hu and Mr. Zhao
would jointly run China. s' Of course, this alone does not assure that
the young and college educated successors will continue Deng's trend
toward a more market oriented economy and away from the traditional
178. Deng has been the driving force behind China's new Open Door policies. See
generally Selk, Economic Scene: The Open Door Policy In China, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27,
1985, at D2, col. 1. Deng's open door policy has opened up four Special Economic Zones,
which include fourteen cities that will serve as a "window" for observing contemporary
capitalism. Id.
179. Reverse Takeover, supra note 149, at 47.
180. V. Fung, supra note 177, at 6, col. 1.
181. Selk, supra note 178, at D2, col. 1; Goldman, The Chinese Take An Economic
Step, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1985, at A31, col. 5. ("Mr. Deng is putting young experts in
positions of power in hope that they will continue to encourage his policies after he is
gone").
182. V. Fung, supra note 177, at 6, col. 1.
183. Id. Much to his dismay, Deng Xiaoping's plans for an orderly transfer of power
to Hu Yaobang have been completely dismantled. On Jan. 16, 1987, Mr. Hu, the leader
of China's Communist Party, was forced to resign after being accused of "'mistakes on
major issues of political principles' " during his tenure. Gargan, Leader of Party in
China is Ousted for His Mistakes, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1987, at Al, col. 6. Prime Minis-
ter Zhao Zigyang was appointed to temporarily replace Mr. Hu as acting general secre-
tary of the party. Id. It is not clear at this time whether Mr. Hu's removal was motivated
by Mr. Deng or forced by the party's old conservative block. Many academic specialists
view Mr. Hu's removal as undermining the succession process which Mr. Deng so labori-
ously set in place. Butterfield, Hu's Ouster: Deng's Role, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1987, at
Al, A4, col. 6, 2. It was, however, also reported that Mr. Hu's removal was possibly the
result of serious disagreements between he and Mr. Deng and that "Deng decided Hu
wasn't up to his shoes." Butterfield, supra at A4, col. 3; Gargan, supra at A4, col. 5.
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Soviet model of centralized planning and heavy industry.""'
There remains pressure from Deng's opposition not to follow, in
their view, a radical departure from the old Maoist ways. A powerful
conservative coalition remains in the Politburo which does not favora-
bly view Deng's economic position.185 Considering that some of these
more influential opponents are "youths" themselves as compared to
Deng, they may very possibly outlast Deng and return the Politburo to
its more conservative economic policies of the past. 8 6 Observers note,
however, that before Deng relinquishes his party posts he will have
persuaded members of the "conservative old guard" to retire, thus re-
moving any conservative challenges.1s7
It seems that the political climate has mainly affected the invest-
ments of local, not foreign, investors. A general manager of a Hong
Kong bank said that though confidence in short term investment has
revived "it is the foreigners who have been more comfortable with the
political risk than the local Chinese entrepreneur. "188 Thus, a great un-
known of the coming years is whether the local Hong Kong Chinese
business community will take heed of foreign investors continuing in-
vestment in Hong Kong, or liquidate Hong Kong holdings overseas."8 9
IV. CONCLUSION
The signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in December
1984 marked the beginning of a new political and economic era for
Hong Kong. With investment cycles at only three to five years, 90 it
will be up to the business community and governments involved to sta-
184. Goldman, supra note 181, at A31, col. 5.
185. Id. This "inner circle" has "criticized such Western thinkers as Sarte, Freud,
Kafka and the Eurocommunists for leading China's youth astray." Id. at A31, col. 6.
186. See generally Goldman, supra note 181, at A31, col. 5. Deng may also field op-
position from the army which is not benefitting from the fruits of economic reform. Per-
haps, Perhaps, Perhaps. . . supra note 3, at 4. One prominent Hong Kong business-
man described succinctly that "[i]f Deng Xiaoping drops dead or the army, which has
been pushed aside a bit in China, makes a come back, we might have a backhander."
The Crucial Confidence Factor, supra note 48, at 161.
187. Id. It has been reported that foreigners view the chances of China reverting to
the unstable days of the Cultural Revolution as remote. This is due to Deng's reforms
which have improved the standard of living as reflected by peasant income increasing
eighty percent between 1981 and 1985, and an increase in grain output of twenty-six
percent over the same period. Fung, supra note 177, at 6, col. 3.
188. The Crucial Confidence Factor, supra note 48, at 161 (this manager added that
"Beijing has to convince the local entrepreneur that things won't change again the fu-
ture"). Id.
189. Id. at 163; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
190. Perhaps, Perhaps, Perhaps. . . , supra note 3, at 5.
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bilize economic sentiment and assure a prosperous future for one of the
world's largest markets.
The Joint Declaration is binding on both China and Great Britain,
and has passed the first crucial tests of the administration of its provi-
sions. Without question, the biggest test of the Agreement's long-term
effect will rest on the viability of the Basic Law's final draft. The inter-
national community eagerly awaits its arrival.
Division over the future of Hong Kong seems to be based upon
one's philosophical orientation and discipline. Optimists are found
readily camped within business circles. While the business community
bases its optimism on the political rhetoric of a binding agreement, it
adds substance to its beliefs by increasingly investing capital in Hong
Kong's real property and commercial markets. As a result, Hong Kong
is experiencing a solid economic revival.
Pessimists, however, provide constant reminders to the business
community of the political realities involved in drafting Hong Kong's
Basic Law. If differences in interpretation of the Joint Declaration con-
tinue to develop with regard to how the Basic Law will be drafted and
what interests will be protected, one can only speculate as to the differ-
ences that may arise when implementing the final draft of Hong
Kong's new constitution in 1997. The business community must realize
that no matter how non-interventionist any government may be, ulti-
mately governments control economies based upon their political doc-
trines. Thus, it has been stated that if "China can barely run one sys-
tem consistently for any length of time, what hope is there for two?""' 1
While optimists focus on economic statistics examining the inter-
dependence between Hong Kong and China, pessimists look to Hong
Kong's economic statistics en masse. It is probable that with regard to
the fulfillment of the Joint Declaration's terms, the factors concerning
economic interdependence may more accurately reflect Hong Kong's
likelihood of future success as a world market.
Presently, both Britain and China have adhered to the Agreement
in all of its essential terms. There is no indication that either party will
behave otherwise in the future. China's investments on the Island
make more tangible her "political good will" towards Hong Kong's cap-
italist system, and no one doubts that Britain will remove herself by
1997.192 If China continues its liberalized economic policies it will in
time become increasingly dependent upon and accustomed to the eco-
nomic advantages of capitalism. As each week passes, Hong Kong may
reap small assurances of the soundness of its economic future, although
191. Id. at 3.
192. More Fears Than Cheers In H.K., EUROMONEY, Apr. 1985, at 151.
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quite possibly that picture might not be purely capitalistic.
For the remaining eleven years through 1997, and to a large degree
for the fifty years hence, multinational businesses have reason to ex-
pect returns on their short term investments. Whether Hong Kong will
remain a major financial market will depend on who is in power in
Beijing in 1997. 19 At this time, the political climate is favorable and
Deng Xio Peng is making certain, to the best of his ability, that the
political and economic climate remains so, long after he has passed.
Leonard J. Turkel
193. Perhaps, Perhaps, Perhaps. . . , supra note 3, at 4.
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